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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to provide an overall review and assessment of the virtues and ﬂaws of
decentralized self-regulated markets, discussing in particular the extent to which deceiving attitudes by some
market participants might be potentially diluted and contradicted.
Design/methodology/approach – To approach deception and morality in markets, the paper follows
two paths. First, the relevant recent literature on the theme is reviewed, examined and debated, and second,
one constructs a simulation model equipped with the required elements to discuss the immediate and long-
term impacts of deceiving behaviour over market outcomes.
Findings – The discussion and the model allow for highlighting the main drivers of the purchasing
decisions of consumers and for evaluating how they react to manipulating behaviour by ﬁrms in the market.
Agents pursuing short-run gains through unfair market practices are likely to be punished as fooled agents
spread the word about themalpractices they were allegedly subject to.
Research limitations/implications – Markets are complex entities, where large numbers of individual
agents typically establish local and direct contact with one another. These agents differ in many respects and
interact in unpredictable ways. Assembling a concise model capable of addressing such complexity is a
difﬁcult task. The framework proposed in this paper points in the intended direction.
Originality/value – The debate in this paper contributes to a stronger perception on the mechanisms that
attribute robustness and vitality to markets.
Keywords Markets, Deception, Morality, Purchasing decisions, Preferences, Rumour spreading
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Markets are one of the most robust forces in nature and society. Even after the most
calamitous tragedy, market relations will recover with an exceptional vitality as
individuals engage again in trading relations that are crucial for their survival and
wellbeing. To gain the conﬁdence of the other players, market participants must avoid
dishonest and deceiving attitudes, and therefore, one might infer that stable and long-
lasting market equilibrium is inseparable from morality and honesty. Nevertheless, as
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insistently pointed out by non-orthodox thinking in economics, equilibrium is more an
exception than the rule, implying that in many market circumstances, manipulation and
deception might pay off. The aim of this paper is to discuss ﬁrst through a brief literature
review and second by assembling a straightforward simulation model, the ability
markets have to self-regenerate, albeit they are systematically hit by individual
behaviour that disrupts conﬁdence and trustworthiness.
Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. From the perspective of
market interactions, this popular saying reﬂects well the kind of defences markets
possess to self-regulate and to regenerate themselves. Often, people are tempted to
pursue unfair and deceiving trading practices, especially in the absence of strong
regulation and enforcement of penalties by the proper authorities. But markets have
the capacity to circumvent less honourable and righteous practices, namely, when the
trade relation allows for repeated interaction. Transactions presuppose mutual gain,
and this implies that those willing to trade with us expect us to have a fair behaviour
and vice-versa. Reciprocity will imply that honest behaviour is a stable equilibrium
toward which the market outcome is likely to converge. In this sense, deception may
be viewed as a disturbance or an anomaly that eventually sets in particular
circumstances, which might repeat themselves with a relatively high frequency (e.g.
when an inexperienced player enters the market or when someone forgets how she
was fooled sometime in the past).
Some recent literature (Akerlof and Shiller, 2016; Basu, 2016; Perri, 2016) points out that
uneven and unfair market relations are pervasive; in fact, they become in many cases the
rule rather than the exception. If people consume goods that are bad to their health, or if they
spend more than what they will be able to pay without compromising their future well-
being, it is because they are lured to act in that way. Impulses, urges and emotions which are
inseparable from human nature are often perceived by market players as vulnerabilities that
are available to be exploited. For instance, people’s choices are susceptible to intertemporal
inconsistences (preferences are contingent on temporal distance) and this is the reason why
an individual may accept today a ﬁnancial deal that brings an immediate reward but that
implies relevant future discommodities.
Rationality, taken to the extreme, appears to have a dark side. Rational agents in the
market are focussed on pursuing their own interests, sometimes taking to the limit their will
to persuade others. Firms spend large sums of money in marketing and advertising, and
although these are useful activities, in the sense, they allow for the dissemination of
information about the attributes of the goods and services ﬁrms sell, they are many times
used as an instrument to exploit the emotional vulnerabilities and weaknesses of people.
Markets are, in this perspective, an uneven platform of interaction where some players act
as ruthless optimizers, while others are caught off guard being at the mercy of those
endowed with the ability to control and manipulate. This view takes us away from the idea
of markets as instruments that promote economic and social harmony, i.e. as entities where
equilibrium outcomes are the inevitable consequence of the self-interested behaviour of all
the participants.
The paper discusses the extent of manipulation practices in a wide array of markets, the
capacity they have to self-regenerate and the evolutionary nature of the market participants.
This is done by pursuing, in a ﬁrst moment, a general discussion and literature review on
the pros and cons of free market relations (second section). In the second stage, a simulation
model is assembled to highlight and explore the dynamics of deception, morality and self-
regeneration in markets. Rational and emotional determinants of purchasing decisions are
systematized (third section); transmission channels of manipulation over the motivation to
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buy are put into perspective (fourth section); and natural and intuitive defence mechanisms
that balance market relations, as morality, empathy and sympathy, are equated (ﬁfth
section). All the mentioned features are put together in a modelling structure that allows,
through simulation, to identify trends concerning the survival and expansion of ﬁrms and
the changes on consumer preferences. The ﬁnal section concludes.
Markets: dangerous arenas or cooperation forums?
To reﬂect on the intrinsic and general properties of markets is a ﬁrst fundamental step
in the effort to understand how they beneﬁt or penalize those who engage in exchange
relations. An inﬂuential perspective on the nature of markets is Friedrich von Hayek’s
view about spontaneous orders. Bowles et al. (2017) reminisce that Hayek interpreted
markets as complex systems where individuals endowed with a limited knowledge on
the structure and dynamics of the market would compete to serve their own interests,
allowing for the emergence of a coherent whole. In this view, markets need no
regulation because free enterprise would be the best form to coordinate individual
actions in a large scale.
Markets have the ability to self-regulate because events that affect business relations,
although perceived only by few in a ﬁrst moment, rapidly propagate through bargaining
mechanisms and the respective adjustment in prices. Although individuals have no capacity
to take a comprehensive view over markets, their ﬁelds of vision sufﬁciently overlap,
meaning that all relevant information ends up by being communicated to all.
Hayek’s view is consistent with an agent-based approach to market dynamics, as the
one we will sketch later in the paper. This approach takes agent heterogeneity and
decentralized interaction to simulate aggregate outcomes. In this type of models, as in
observable market relations, markets do not converge to equilibrium positions.
Disequilibria tend to persist. Systematic learning and diffusion place the economy in a
state of recurrent evolution.
Besides the dominance of out-of-equilibrium outcomes, another fundamental feature of
the dynamics of markets is the heterogeneity of agents, given the position they momentarily
occupy. Markets are uneven and heterogeneous by nature. Agents may enter the market
with different degrees of information and perception of market conditions and, therefore,
perform identical transactions accepting different deals[1].
Since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) on asymmetric information, many economists
believe that the main issues one should worry about when dealing with market anomalies are
those related with the position’s agents occupy and that make them have access to a higher or
lower degree of information. Signalling and screening are two forms of approaching the
information asymmetries problem. Signalling concerns, the process through which the
informed party provides relevant information for the decision screening is associated with
the idea of searching for the required information. Dosis (2016) proves that in a strategic
interaction scenario, the combination of signalling and screening may allow to ﬁnd an
efﬁcient equilibrium result.
Despite the importance of asymmetric information, however, there are other profound
problems in the functioning of markets, with less straightforward solutions. In Akerlof and
Shiller (2016), a systematic enumeration of situations of manipulation and deception in
markets are identiﬁed and described. The main strong idea of the “phishing for fools”
arguments of these authors is that agents, in the particular context of a market relation, may
assume one of two roles: some agents are vulnerable and gullible, while others are hyper-
rational and able to impose their perspective on others. The position of agents is contingent
on personality traits and transaction scenarios: in some circumstances, the same individual
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may be susceptible to be taken as a fool, while in other settings, he/she can be the agent
better equipped to take advantage of the transaction.
It is frequent to ﬁnd an explosive combination of gullible behaviour of unearned buyers
and optimality-oriented and self-centred attitude of those who produce and sell (although the
opposite may also be true). But market relations are not necessarily a zero-sum game where
those who have the ability to deceive win at the expenses of the vulnerable and distracted.
Frequently, the forces in the market better equipped to act upon it have advantage in
behaving righteously, altruistically and obeying to moral principles. This creates an
environment of trust and conﬁdence that fosters business relations. Furthermore, even when
manipulation and deception may have undisputable economic advantages, agents may
disregard such advantage if their actions are guided by moral principles that prevent them
from cheating others.
As suggested by Basu (2016), it would be interesting to analyse market relations
considering three types of agents: the deceivers, those susceptible of being deceived, and
those who behave as guardians of morality, even when this morality does not allow to
maximize economic gains. A model with these features would necessarily be an
evolutionary framework, where agents could transcend from an eventual state of neutrality
to any of the categories highlighted above and where agents might also change positions as
trade circumstances are modiﬁed (e.g. someone who is vulnerable may evolve to a position
of market predator as she learns with experience). The formalization of a theory of market
relations and of decision-making with these features, where individual agents are endowed
with distinct abilities to develop business transactions, could allow for important insights to
understand how agent heterogeneity leads to the formation of prices and to the fulﬁlment of
transactions that depart from standard market results. It is in this direction that the model to
construct in the next sections will proceed.
A “phishing for fools” theory, designed over the just described guidelines, must be
pervasive and general, but it should also account for the diversity and speciﬁcity of markets.
For instance, ﬁnancial markets have their own speciﬁcities, and manipulation and deception
may acquire, in these, unique features. In fact, ﬁnance is a ﬁeld where market anomalies
have been thoroughly studied (Ramiah and Moosa, 2015). In ﬁnancial markets, it is clear
that agents do not always act rationally, adopting heuristics and being subject to biases.
There is a wide range of possible deviations from rational behaviour that a detailed and
careful analysis of this kind of markets should consider, from herding behaviour to loss
aversion, conservatism and others.
By developing a theory of manipulation and deception, economists must also account for
the respective policy implications. The main question, according to Basu (2016), is whether it
is possible to design an institution capable of guaranteeing that manipulation and deception
are corrected without harming efﬁciency. Moreover, regulatory institutions are not immune
to manipulation themselves, and their existence and interference might lead to outcomes
where the distortion is stronger than the one provoked by market participants when these
do not follow elementary rules of social conduct.
Deception in markets is not a linear reality. As Gruss and Piotti (2010) highlight,
deception is related to the distortion or manipulation of the reality with the intention of
making people to act in ways that are not beneﬁcial to their own interests. According with
the mentioned authors, two forms of deception may emerge:
(1) strategic deception, which arises from the opportunistic nature of people; and
(2) deception emerging from rationality failures, which can be associated to the idea of
self-deception.
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This last kind of deception is in part explained by psychological factors, although it is also
socially determined; often, people adopt behaviours in markets that are harmful to
themselves to comply with some informal social norms (e.g. when someone chooses to
smoke to be accepted by a group of people).
In fact, self-deception is an important human trace, with important implications for
market relations (Gerschlager, 2007). People might be disappointed with market outcomes
because they always expect their own interests to be fulﬁlled. People conceive, for
themselves, the most favourable scenarios, but these do not necessarily occur; as a result,
self-deception becomes relevant and it conditions decisions and actions. There might exist a
gap between human ambitions and human capabilities, which leads to self-deception and
frustration in market transactions, what may be as harmful for the functioning of the
markets as manipulation from a third party.
Economics and the analysis of markets are based on the idea of self-interest: people do
what best serves their own interests. Does this mean that people are not driven by moral
values and altruism? Zak (2011) argues that the two things are not incompatible. It is
possible to pursue individual interests and simultaneously to follow a righteous moral
conduct. The view of this author is that market exchange requires morality, and that
markets reinforce morality. Morality is required for market relations because these are
expected to be win-win situations, where all the involved parties draw some beneﬁt.
Excessive greed hinders trade. Morality arises naturally because people seek honesty and
trustworthiness and avoid dishonest behaviour. In short, moral values facilitate
exchange.
One important issue is whether morality can be measured and how it can be
incorporated in economic models. For instance, the utility function in the standard
intertemporal optimization model might be modiﬁed to include concern with others.
Empathy can be translated in a utility function where the consumption of others is an
argument of the individual function. While some moral values are universal, others are
contingent on the speciﬁc social scenario in which economic relations take place. In any
case, moral behaviour is a natural mechanism of imposing fair market relations knowing
that the alternative would be large enforcement costs.
Altruistic behaviour, although absent from conventional economic theory, is an
important feature of human action. Moreover, altruism may have an evolutionary
advantage; societies where altruistic behaviour dominates may more easily build and
maintain the institutions required to thrive and guarantee prosperity (Manner and Gowdy,
2010). Free riding and the tragedy of the commons are less intense problems where altruistic
punishment is strong. Altruistic punishment is related to the sacriﬁces people are willing to
make to punish those who do not comply with accepted norms of behaviour.
The notion that morality is essential to economic relations to thrive goes back to Adam
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (White, 2010; Paganelli, 2010; Witztum, 2010). Because
trade means interacting with strangers, it facilitates moral development: relatively to
strangers, one has to establish a kind of relation where emotions are contained. The invisible
hand exists and has a coordinating power that allows for the division of labour and for the
interdependency among strangers.
The main conclusion, when observing how people effectively act in business
transactions, is that although actions of agents are primarily driven by self-interest,
individuals are in no circumstance completely amoral. They experience moral emotions that
regulate their behaviour. Such moral emotions include guilt and virtue. Actions that beneﬁt
others tend to be self-reinforced in the spirit of individuals, as they are perceived as virtuous.
Actions that harm others are actions that individuals refrain to take as they may experience
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guilt. These ideas might be incorporated in an economic model to address the extent to
which moral sentiments may inﬂuence behaviour andwelfare (Kaplow and Shavell, 2007).
To close this section, we mention three additional notes that are relevant for the
discussion on the perils of free markets:
(1) Unregulated markets, even if admittedly non-manipulated, may generate extreme
unfair results. Kaplan and Rauh (2013) discuss the impact of strong income
concentration in global markets. Top earners obtain rents from their global reach
that are becoming progressively higher. Markets have many subtleties that must
be carefully weighted. One strong idea is that markets are not fair in the way they
distribute income. Some people, because of the position they occupy, because of
their natural talents or because they were capable to contribute with a relevant
innovation, tend to concentrate income. Inequalities in market income generation
are a relevant topic of analysis that should be carefully addressed and correlated
with eventual deceiving behaviour.
(2) Are aggressive marketing and advertising strategies necessarily harmful for less
skilful or prepared market participants? Not necessarily. Lindstrom (2008) argues
that the more consumers know about the tactics of advertisers the better they will
be able to react to them; there is a process of learning through contacting with
advertising. Moreover, market studies are important for ﬁrms to explore the
desires and needs of people, which is not necessarily bad because this may help
ﬁrms in producing and delivering to the market the goods and services that people
enjoy, need and want to buy.
(3) Brands, labels and certiﬁcation are means through which information in markets
might be increased, which allows for improved competition and less potential
manipulation, and thus, they also bring beneﬁts for all market participants.
Bonroy and Constantatos (2015) argue that labelling may have some undesirable
side effects over market competition. They might allow for increased transparency,
but they can also promote market concentration and some possible predatory
lobbying favouring those with a stronger position in the market. A labelling
system must be credible and efﬁcient to avoid possible distortions. Labelling is one
of the possible mechanisms to ﬁght manipulation and deception, although in an
economy with weak institutions, the opposite may indeed occur.
Drivers of individual purchasing decisions: price and variety matching
Markets are complex systems with multiple heterogeneous agents engaging in
systematic interactions. Thus, as suggested by Bowles et al. (2017), agent-based
computational models might constitute an adequate framework to approach market
dynamics, when one wants to account for deceit, morality, gullibility, sympathy and
related phenomena. Zhang and Zhang (2007) propose a model of this kind, where a
motivation function for purchasing a variety of a good is presented. Motivation to buy
depends on the price, on the preference for a given variety, on advertising and on the
inﬂuence exerted by other consumers. Price and a matching with the intended variety are
the structural factors leading an agent to acquire some good from a given ﬁrm,
suggestion or manipulation through advertising or other factors might distort the
expected outcome. Once eventual deceit is perceived, consumers and other market
players may penalize the ﬁrms that do not follow a correct conduct both directly and by
inﬂuencing the decisions of other consumers.
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The ﬁrst step in assembling our market interaction model consists in building a
motivation function, i.e. a function through which a given consumer i evaluates conditions
offered by suppliers and selects the ﬁrm from which to buy the good. The motivation
function to consider will be inspired in the reasoning presented by Zhang and Zhang (2007)
where, as mentioned above, four main determinants of purchasing decisions are assumed:
price, quality matching, advertising intensity and the inﬂuence of others. We modify this
original motivation function by taking, besides price and quality matching, a purchasing
driver attached to the propensity of ﬁrms to manipulate and deceive and another purchasing
driver linked with how society (the other consumers) react to deceiving behaviour.
Consider that at a given time moment, J ﬁrms are present in the market, and that each
ﬁrm j = 1, 2,. . .,J supplies a different variety of the good. The motivation function of
consumer i, at date t, regarding the variety of the good supplied by ﬁrm j, will be:
Mij tð Þ ¼ f ij tð ÞPj tð Þ þ c ij tð ÞQj tð Þ þ u ij tð ÞDj tð Þ þ l ij tð ÞSj tð Þ (1)
In equation (1), Pj(t) is the price of variety j at date t, Qj(t) is a measure of the qualitative
features of the variety j, Dj(t) quantiﬁes the extent in which ﬁrm j acts with the objective of
manipulating consumer i and Sj(t) stands for the degree of disapproval of other consumers
about hypothetical dishonest practices by suppliers. The variables denoted by Greek letters
represent the sensitivity of an individual’s choice to each of the purchasing motivation
determinants mentioned above.
The purchasing decision of consumer i is undertaken after evaluation of equation (1) for
each of the available suppliers. The chosen j corresponds to the ﬁrm for which condition
Max {Mi1 tð Þ;Mi2 tð Þ; . . . ;MiJ tð Þ} is satisﬁed. Firms which sell more are those for which the
presented condition is met more frequently given the array of assumed consumers.
Next, we must characterize each element of equation (1). Let us start by assuming that
the price is given by the following standardmark-up rule:
Pj tð Þ ¼ 11þ h
 
CMj tð Þ (2)
Value h < 0 is the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand and CMj(t) stands for the
marginal cost, which is assumed to be an inverse function of productivity. Productivity, in
turn, varies across ﬁrms, but, for reasons of simpliﬁcation, it is considered to be constant
over time (and randomly assigned to ﬁrms). Letting Hj represent productivity, we take
CMj tð Þ ¼ zHj ; z > 0. In this speciﬁcation, the price charged by each ﬁrm remains constant
over time, given that marginal costs are also constant, but different productivity levels
imply different prices across ﬁrms.
The term translating consumer’s price sensitivity to variety j is adapted from a similar
expression in Zhang and Zhang (2007) and takes the form:
f ij tð Þ ¼ a PjPeð Þ þ ~aki (3)
with a > 1, ki > 0 and ~a > 0; Pe is the expected price of the good. Note that f ij tð Þ must be
negative, because the motivation to buy necessarily falls with a higher price. Parameter kwill
possibly possess different values for different consumers, which reﬂects their heterogeneity,
in this case regarding their socio-economic status; a larger k will indicate that people are less
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sensitive to price (e.g. rich individuals will be less sensitive to price). The expected price
might be conceived as the average of the prices of all varieties, which is also constant:
Pe ¼ 1J
XJ
j¼1
Pj ¼ 1J
1
1þ h
 
z
XJ
j¼1
1
Hj
(4)
Note that under the chosen speciﬁcation, the price term in the motivation equation, f ijPj, is
constant over time basically because of the constant over time productivity, although it
varies across ﬁrms, also because they are endowed with distinct productivity levels; it also
varies across consumers because of different price sensitivity values.
Consider an illustrative example where 100 consumers are in the market and eight
ﬁrms supply the good. Take the following admissible parameter values: h = 0.75, z =
0.25, a = 1.25, ~a ¼ 0:01 and assume that the array of productivity levels of ﬁrms is such
that Hjþ1 = Hj  (1.02), with H1 = 1. The sensitivity of individuals to price will be
randomly given by an exponential distribution[2]; the parameter of the distribution is set
at l = 20 (the higher the value of this parameter, the more high values of k depart from
the average value).
In this purely static setting, where the price is the only motivating force for purchasing
the good, every consumer will select ﬁrm j = 8 to materialize the purchase, as this is the ﬁrm
with the highest productivity and, thus, the ﬁrm that is able to sell at the lowest price.
Although sensitivity to price matters, rational consumers will always select the lowest price,
when this is the single criteria involved in the purchasing decision. A simulation exercise
allows to ﬁnd, in our 100 consumers’ environment, a minimum value of k equal to 5.0584 
108 and a maximum value of 15.9684; for these, f 8P8 =0.8583 in the ﬁrst case and f 8P8
= 0.7193 in the second case; although the motivation to buy is lower in the ﬁrst case (the
consumer is more sensitive to price, because her income is lower); in both cases, the choice of
ﬁrm j= 8 is the best choice.
Thus far, purchasing decision is rather simple. Only price matters, and consumers pick
the ﬁrm with the lowest marginal cost to buy the good, as this is the one delivering it to the
market at the lowest price. We now introduce a second relevant term of the motivation
equation, which is the one regarding the matching between the preferences of the consumer
and the variety supplied by each ﬁrm. Assume that all varieties of the good are equally good
from a qualitative point of view and normalize Qj(t) = 1, Vj. Varieties are not indifferent to
the consumer because they have different tastes or preferences; let preferences be deﬁned in
the interval (0,1) and let r i(t) be a random variable quantifying these preferences; let also
s j(t) be the quality index of the variety in the same interval. The quality sensitivity to
variety j is, then, measured by the following term:
c ij tð Þ ¼ b jr
i tð Þs j tð Þj þ ‘ (5)
with b [ (0,1) and ‘ [ R a calibrating parameter. Because b is lower than 1, the better the
match between preferences and what the ﬁrm has to offer, the larger will be the value of
c ij tð Þ and, thus, the stronger the motivation to adhere to the purchase of this variety.
In the presence of constant preferences and constant variety supply, value c ij will not
change over time. If we ignore the manipulation and morality components of the problem,
we have, so far, a static problem where only price and preferences matter for the choice of
the consumer.
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Recover the price example. We now add to this example the variety-preferences
deliberation. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, a good that is identical in every
possible characteristic except colour (for example, a toothbrush or a personal agenda).
Take the RGB colour code, which generates a wide array of colours by combining red,
green and blue in tones that can be classiﬁed in the integers range from 0 to 255. In this
system, 16,777,216 possible colours can be generated. Assume that the eight existing
ﬁrms produce the good with a different RGB colour, and that the available colours are:
black (ﬁrm j = 1), RGB = (0,0,0); white (ﬁrm j = 2), RGB = (255, 255, 255); red (ﬁrm j = 3),
RGB = (255, 0, 0); green (ﬁrm j = 4), RGB = (0, 255, 0); blue (ﬁrm j = 5), RGB = (0, 0, 255);
yellow (ﬁrm j = 6), RGB = (255, 255, 0); cyan (ﬁrm j = 9), RGB = (0, 255, 255); and
magenta (ﬁrm j = 10), RGB = (255, 0, 255). Consumers, in turn, will have preferences
uniformly distributed over the whole pallet of possible colours, and they will choose the
supplied colour that is closer to their preferences. Consider that the difference between
preferences and available varieties is expressed in the interval (0, 1) according to the
following equation:
jr i  s jj ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r iR sRð Þ2 þ r iG sGð Þ2 þ r iB sBð Þ2
3
r
255
(6)
where r iR; r
i
G; r
i
B represent the red, green, blue preferences, respectively, and sR, sG, sB
represent the red, green, blue varieties, respectively. Given equation (6), if a consumer
prefers white and ﬁrm j supplies white, then |r i – s j| = 0; if the same consumer is faced
with a ﬁrm supplying black, then |r i – s j| = 1. Consider a less extreme example, where the
consumer prefers a light beige RGB = (245, 245, 220). Table I indicates the value of the term
in equation (6) that reﬂects matching with what each ﬁrm supplies.
Because one is searching for the minimal distance between preferences and available
varieties, Table I clearly indicates that the best consumer choice is to buy white, and that, at
some distance, the second-best option is yellow, the two colours closer to the manifested
preference.
Let b = 0.5 and ‘ = –0.75; with these values, c ij 2 0:25; 0:25½ , i.e. when the
intended colour is exactly the one supplied by the ﬁrm, the motivation to buy is positive
and adds a value of 0.25 to the motivation function; if the supplied colour is the exact
opposite of the preferred one, then the motivation to buy receives a negative
contribution of0.25.
Table I.
Colour ﬁt, given the
beige preference
Firm r i – s j
j = 1 0.9293
j = 2 0.0855
j = 3 0.7459
j = 4 0.7459
j = 5 0.7885
j = 6 0.4991
j = 7 0.5608
j = 8 0.5608
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Return to the simulation exercise. Now, the price is not the only seller selection
criterion. Choices are also driven by preferences. This disturbs the outcome, making
some buyers to choose other than the cheapest variety. Table II presents the
obtained results for ten simulations (recall that results differ because there is a
couple of random variables, namely, the price sensitivity k, and the consumer
preference index, r i).
Table II highlights the relevance of price in the choice of consumers, with the
cheapest varieties being the ones with higher demand; nevertheless, preferences and
variety matching obscure the price effect as in every case, there are consumers willing
to buy the most expensive variety given their strongest preference for it: if consumers
want black, they may end up buying black even if this is the most expensive variety of
the good.
Not so fair play: business manipulation and deception
So far, by maintaining productivity, preferences and production technologies constant, our
analysis of the motivation to buy is static. We now introduce dynamics by attaching the
main idea of our analysis: the possibility of manipulation by ﬁrms and, posteriorly, moral
behaviour by consumers.
Imagine that at period t, a given ﬁrm j adopts a manipulating behaviour (Dj(t) = 1),
while the others maintain the fair play (Dj(t) = 0). This will imply, in the short-run, that
consumers will be artiﬁcially more motivated to purchase that variety of the good. In
moment t, the agent is receptive to the new information received, and its sensitivity
parameter will take a value u ij tð Þ > 0. We assume that deception continues to have an
effect and grows over the next periods, but at a given point in time, the consumer
perceives that he/she is being manipulated, and as a result, the value of the sensitivity
parameter sharply declines to negative values: under the principle fool me once shame on
you, fool me twice shame on me, the attempt to maintain the deceiving behaviour will not
have everlasting effects. Over time, and after the negative reaction to manipulation, the
consumer will progressively forget the deceiving behaviour and the value of u ij will
converge to 0 in the long-run (if no other attempt to manipulate is undertaken by the same
ﬁrm).
To reﬂect the above reasoning, consider the following function of sensitivity to
manipulation:
Table II.
Selection of suppliers
in ten experiences
with the same
parameter values
Experiment Frequency of consumers selecting each firm
#1 (8, 3, 7, 5, 14, 14, 21, 28)
#2 (7, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 15, 29)
#3 (2, 7, 5, 5, 13, 17, 19, 22)
#4 (2, 0, 7, 5, 10, 15, 24, 37)
#5 (6, 5, 5, 7, 17, 9, 23, 28)
#6 (3, 4, 6, 8, 7, 20, 26, 26)
#7 (4, 2, 9, 6, 9, 23, 19, 28)
#8 (6, 3, 5, 9, 8, 26, 18, 25)
#9 (5, 2, 7, 5, 5, 18, 30, 18)
#10 (2, 4, 5, 11, 8, 21, 20, 29)
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u ij tð Þ ¼
t
a t1b
; t 6¼ ab
0; t ¼ ab
; a; b > 0
8><
>: (7)
According to equation (7), time period t = ab will correspond to the threshold when the
consumer realizes that he/she is being fooled and changes drastically his/her behaviour from
strongly accepting the communication of the ﬁrm to strongly rejecting it. Therefore, in the
proposed framework, manipulation has a positive short-run effect for the ﬁrm, but after a
few periods, the deceiving ﬁrm will start losing clients as the motivation to buy falls, given
the consumers’ perception that they might be again deceived.
Return, once again, to the example. Assume that ﬁrm j = 5 (the “blue” ﬁrm) adopts a
deceiving behaviour at date t, and that, for all consumers, the sensitivity to manipulation is
given by equation (7), with a = 101 and b = 1/3. With these values, if the moment of the
change in the ﬁrm’s behaviour is t = 1, then u 5(1) = 0.01; this value will rise until u 5(4) =
0.1081 and, then, will suddenly fall to u 5(5) = –0.2083. After t = 5, the value of the sensitivity
termwill progressively converge to 0.
Let us apply this deceiving behaviour to the last example in Table II and consider that the
respective distribution of consumers is the one effectively observed at t# 0. Given the deceiving
behaviour of ﬁrm j = 5 at t=1, the distribution ofﬁrmswill evolve as indicated inTable III.
The changes of consumer choice presented in the table reveal that in this speciﬁc
example, ﬁrms j = 2, j = 3 and j = 4 are not affected by the manipulating behaviour of ﬁrm
j = 5; they maintain in all periods the same costumers. The remaining ﬁrms lose clients to
ﬁrm j = 5 in a ﬁrst phase and then, after t = 4, they recover those clients. Firm j = 5 gains a
signiﬁcant number of customers in the initial phase, and, once perceived the manipulating
behaviour, all clients are lost, although they are progressively recovered in the next periods
until the initial equilibrium is ﬁnally restored. Figure 1 shows the time trajectory of the
number of costumers associated with ﬁrm j= 5.
Morality strikes back: consumers spread the word
Besides the direct impact analysed in the previous section, the deceiving behaviour of ﬁrm j
might have reputational damages as well. Imagine that a single consumer considers that the
deceiving behaviour of ﬁrm j is, in a ﬁrst moment, worth being denunciated. The
disapproval on the deceiving behaviour will then be eventually passed on to the other
consumers, implying a transitory phase of pervasive resentment toward the ﬁrm with a less
Table III.
Evolution of the
distribution of
consumers across
ﬁrms after the
manipulating
behaviour of ﬁrm,
j = 5
Period Frequency of consumers selecting each firm
t# 0 (2, 4, 5, 11, 8, 21, 20, 29)
t = 1 (2, 4, 5, 11, 9, 21, 19, 29)
t = 2 (2, 4, 5, 11, 11, 21, 18, 28)
t = 3 (1, 4, 5, 11, 15, 21, 16, 27)
t = 4 (0, 4, 5, 11, 29, 19, 10, 22)
t = 5 (3, 4, 5, 11, 0, 21, 21, 35)
t = 6 (3, 4, 5, 11, 3, 21, 21, 32)
t = 7 (3, 4, 5, 11, 4, 21, 21, 31)
t = 8 (2, 4, 5, 11, 6, 21, 21, 30)
. . . t!1 (2, 4, 5, 11, 8, 21, 20, 29)
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honourable behaviour. The action of consumers in this context is solely driven by the
empathy toward others; this action contains no direct economic gain, and it is grounded in
strict moral principles (not wanting others to suffer from the ﬁrm’s misbehaviour that the
consumer that spreads the word had to endure).
To formalize the propagation of the news on the ﬁrm’s manipulating action, we consider a
spreading mechanism like the rumour spreading dynamics studied in the scientiﬁc literature
(Zanette, 2002; Nekovee et al., 2007; Huo et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013). Let xi(t) be the share of
consumers that, at date t, have no knowledge on the deviant behaviour of the ﬁrm. Share yi(t)
represents the share of consumers who are knowledgeable on that behaviour and spread this
information; ﬁnally, share zi(t) are those who know that the ﬁrm has misbehaved but are no
longer engaged in spreading the news (these are frequently known as the stiﬂers). These three
types of consumers compose the whole universe of agents in the demand side, xi(t) þ yi(t) þ
zi(t) = 1. Individual consumers meet randomly with one another with a single other consumer
per period and the following rules, common to the rumour propagation literature, apply:
 When a spreader meets an ignorant, the second becomes a spreader as well with a
probability v [ (0,1).
 When a spreader meets another spreader or a stiﬂer, both individuals become
stiﬂers with a probability z [ (0,1).
These rules may translate in the following set of difference equations:
xi t þ 1ð Þ  xi tð Þ ¼ vxi tð Þyi tð Þ
yi t þ 1ð Þ  yi tð Þ ¼ vxi tð Þyi tð Þ  z yi tð Þ yi tð Þ þ zi tð Þ
 
zi t þ 1ð Þ  zi tð Þ ¼ z yi tð Þ yi tð Þ þ zi tð Þ
 
8><
>: (8)
Equation (8) might be reduced to a two-equation systemwith two unknowns:
yi t þ 1ð Þ  yi tð Þ ¼ vyi tð Þ  v þ zð Þyi tð Þ yi tð Þ þ zi tð Þ
 
zi t þ 1ð Þ  zi tð Þ ¼ z yi tð Þ yi tð Þ þ zi tð Þ
 
(
(9)
The pair of equation (9) characterizes a spreading mechanism such that a single consumer
may adopt, in an initial phase, an indignation attitude toward the manipulating behaviour of
the ﬁrm. This sentiment of disqualiﬁcation of the ﬁrm will then be passed on, through a
Figure 1.
Time trajectory of the
number of clients of
ﬁrm j= 5, with
manipulating
behaviour starting at
t= 1
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gradual spreading process, to a signiﬁcant share of the other ﬁrms, which ﬁrst become
spreaders and then, in the long-run, all end up as stiﬂers. Figure 2 shows the spreading
dynamics for v = 0.75 and z = 0.9. In the long run, there is no spreader, but around 20 per
cent remains unwilling to disseminate compromising information about the deceiving
practices of the ﬁrm (this group includes individuals for which the respective moral conduct
does not compel them to alert others about the observed misconduct).
To simulate the evolution of the distribution of consumers in the presence of a deceiving
behaviour from a ﬁrm, recover the scenario of the previous section where ﬁrm j = 5 engages
in dissimulation in period t = 1. Consumers will react to the absence of fair play following
rule [equation (7)], although an additional effect is now added; this is the effect of consumer
communication as presented in equation (1). Let l ij ¼ 0:005 (the effect of negative
rumours over the motivation to buy is, obviously, negative) and let Sj(t) be the number of
spreaders in each period following the perception that the ﬁrm is adopting an ethically
questionable behaviour. This number of spreaders evolves over time following equation (9).
Because the number of spreaders ﬁrst increases and then declines, there is a period of 10 to
15 periods where the number of costumers of ﬁrm j = 5 persists very low, before the initial
equilibrium is restored.
Table IV indicates what happens in this scenario, taking into account the same starting
point as in the no spreading the word case.
Figure 3 represents the number of consumers associated with ﬁrm j = 5 under the
rumour spreading mechanism. The lighter trajectory represents the outcome with the
spreading word effect, in contrast with the initial pure manipulation effect (darker line). One
observes that consumers’ communication makes it more sluggish the return to the original
scenario: a moral social penalty is imposed to the one who deludes.
Conclusion
Markets are complex entities where agents endowed with distinct capabilities, preferences, moral
codes and views of the world co-exist and co-evolve. To capture such heterogeneity in a
straightforward, comprehensive and manageable analytical framework is a difﬁcult and
cumbersome task. In this paper, market relations were approached focussing the attention on
deceiving behaviour, morality and the capacity markets have to self-regenerate after being
disturbed by eventually opportunistic and deviant behaviour of some of themarket participants.
Figure 2.
Dynamics of the
spreading effect
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After a brief literature review on deception and morality, the study offers a compact
analytical framework capable of synthesizing the most relevant determinants of the
consumers’ purchasing decisions. These necessarily include price and preferences, but
deception and morality can also be integrated in the framework. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed
that manipulation gives place to a fast increase in the preference by the variety of the good
sold by the manipulating ﬁrm, which is followed by a sharp decline in the motivation to buy
such good’s variety once buyers understand they are being fooled. In the long term, the pre-
manipulation equilibrium is restored; the velocity with which this occurs is contingent on
the communication between consumers, which can delay the restauration of the conﬁdence
in the deceiving agent.
Figure 3.
Time trajectory of the
number of clients of
ﬁrm j= 5, with
rumour spreading
process
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Table IV.
Evolution of the
distribution of
consumers across
ﬁrms given the
rumour spreading
process
Period Frequency of consumers selecting each firm
t# 0 (2, 4, 5, 11, 8, 21, 20, 29)
t =1 (2, 4, 5, 11, 9, 21, 19, 29)
t = 2 (2, 4, 5, 11, 11, 21, 18, 28)
t = 3 (1, 4, 5, 11, 15, 21, 16, 27)
t = 4 (0, 4, 5, 11, 29, 19, 10, 22)
t = 5 (3, 4, 5, 11, 0, 21, 21, 35)
t = 6 (3, 4, 5, 11, 3, 21, 21, 32)
t = 7 (3, 4, 5, 11, 4, 21, 21, 31)
t = 8 (3, 4, 5, 11, 3, 21, 21, 32)
t = 9 (3, 4, 5, 11, 3, 21, 21, 32)
t = 10 (3, 4, 5, 11, 3, 21, 21, 32)
t = 11 (3, 4, 5, 11, 1, 21, 21, 34)
t = 12 (3, 4, 5, 11, 0, 21, 21, 35)
t = 13 (3, 4, 5, 11, 0, 21, 21, 35)
t = 14 (3, 4, 5, 11, 0, 21, 21, 35)
t = 15 (3, 4, 5, 11, 1, 21, 21, 34)
t = 16 (2, 4, 5, 11, 3, 21, 21, 32)
t = 17 (2, 4, 5, 11, 4, 21, 21, 31)
t = 18 (2, 4, 5, 11, 6, 21, 21, 30)
t = 19 (2, 4, 5, 11, 6, 21, 21, 30)
t =20 (2, 4, 5, 11, 7, 21, 20, 30)
. . . t!1 (2, 4, 5, 11, 8, 21, 20, 29)
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Notes
1. As an example, see Zhou et al. (2015) for an analysis of buyer heterogeneity in the housing
market, where the heterogeneity is essentially attached to the geographical location of the
potential buyers.
2. Banerjee et al. (2006) claim that the typical distribution of income might be ﬁtted by an
exponential, log-normal, or gamma distribution. Here, we directly associate the sensitivity to
price to the income of the agent and adopt the exponential distribution to reﬂect this connection.
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